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This presentation will attempt to offer an original contribution to the definition of an 
American Existentialism. It will seek to delineate a type of Existentialism that is intrinsically 
American, in touch with its own cultural traditions and schools of thought – especially with 
the tradition of nineteenth-century American Transcendentalism, and that of Emerson in 
particular. In this brief presentation, I will show how Emersonian Transcendentalism both 
channels and transcends Sartrean Existentialist theory, beyond the structural divergences of 
the two theoretical models. These correlations, in turn, will be key for identifying the terms 
of a new form of existential authenticity that emerged in the Romantic culture of mid-
nineteenth-century America. 
 
The first question that comes to mind is, can there be such a thing as an American 
Existentialism? And if so, what is its nature? Walter Kaufmann – the Nietzsche critic – 
claimed that “American philosophy may turn out to be comparable to Roman philosophy: 
mainly derivative.”1 Here, Kaufmann stresses the importance of the transcontinental 
movement of philosophy, which has undeniably paved the way for the emergence of 
                                               
1 Walter Kaufmann, Existentialism, Religion, and Death: Thirteen Essays (New York: New American 
Library, 1976), p. 91. 
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Existentialist ideas in North America. Nevertheless, an appreciation of American philosophy 
as strictly dependent upon European sources is rather reductive: Kaufmann partly undermines 
the sovereign impulse of a nation that has been independent for over two centuries, and 
which has long since produced an intellectual and cultural history of its own. 
In fact, this conception has been refuted by other critics – including the infamous 
Norman Mailer, Ruby Chatterji and George Cotkin – who claimed that “American 
existentialism should be seen as more than a case study in the diffusion of European ideas.”2 
These critics emphasised in their works the presence of idiosyncratic motifs of an 
Existentialist nature throughout American cultural and literary history. Chatterji pointed out 
the essential role that the American Transcendentalists in particular played in the 
dissemination of the Existentialist outlook in North America: 
 
To some extent the American concern with the self as manifested by the 
Transcendentalists, the search for an indigenous as well as individual identity, and 
William James’s idea of the individual consciousness as an “unfinished continuum” 
incapable of arriving at objectivity, provide a fertile soil for existentialist ideas.3 
 
Here, Chatterji highlights a potential intersection between American Transcendentalism and 
Existentialist theory; an approach that simultaneously acknowledges the autarchical 
production of ideas of the American nation. It is this approach that constitutes the 
methodological groundwork of my research. 
 
                                               
2 George Cotkin, Existential America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2003), p. 9. 
3 Ruby Chatterji, Existentialism in American Literature (New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann, 1983), pp. 160-
61. 
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But what is Existentialist theory in the first place? As hard as it may be to pack in a 
few sentences, we can safely say that Existentialism operates at the interstices between being 
and non-being. It focuses on the potentiality for death – of one’s own death; or rather, on the 
consciousness of the potentiality of one’s own death. This constitutes the paradigm for 
nothingness for Jean-Paul Sartre: the ability of consciousness to envisage its own negation. It 
is this consciousness that culminates, simultaneously and paradoxically, in a self-creative 
movement towards ultimate being, as the individual becomes aware of his or her finitude, or 
rather, of his or her perimeter for action.  
 
Unquestionably, the acceptance of the fact that I must die (my running ahead to my 
death in thought) may forcibly remind me of the limited amount of time at my 
disposal,… and thus become a powerful incentive to make the most of my Being here 
and now.4 
 
This reaction against nothingness, which encapsulates a forceful movement of volition 
towards action, corresponds to the notion of Sartrean engagement. On the historical plane, 
this engagement translates as a radical commitment to social and political reality. This is 
what makes Sartrean Existentialism, primarily, a phenomenology that attempts a 
confrontation with the materiality of history. Thus for Sartre, engagement has a double 
function: as it seeks to oppose the emasculating effects implied by nothingness, it 
concomitantly creates the contents of experiences through which the individual may be able 
to realise his or her ownmost self. In the words of Sartre: “Man is nothing else but what he 
purposes, he exists only insofar as he realizes himself, he is therefore nothing else but the 
                                               
4 Kaufmann, Existentialism, Religion, and Death, p. 201. 
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sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is.”5 The reciprocal nature of this 
commitment to action – actions which, in turn, regenerate the self – corresponds to the 
Sartrean position of authenticity: a situation of ontological fulfilment, achieved through the 
realisation of one’s ownmost and innermost self, in relation to the present moment. 
These preliminary remarks will help us to identify the touchpoints between Sartrean 
Existentialism and Emersonian Transcendentalism. 
 
In his essay “Nature,” Emerson examines the ways in which individuals both embody 
and exemplify the essence of nature. For Emerson, man is predicated by the creative spirit of 
nature, which he terms “universal soul;”6 and all individuals partake in a greater unity that is 
essentially spiritual and that manifests the universal principle of creation. It implies that, for 
Emerson, the divine is not conceived as an external and omnipotent godhead; rather, it is 
envisioned as a form of pantheist divinity that directly penetrates the here-and-now, subjects 
and objects, all together. It is both transcendent and immanent. 
In the essay “History,” Emerson probes the continuum previously established from 
nature to man, and from spirit to matter. Crucially for Emerson, man’s commitment to the 
world is a function of the creative spirit of nature. In other words, man’s commitment to 
history is a corollary of the spiritual motive that precedes him: “The thought is always prior 
to the fact; all the facts of history preexist in the mind as laws [of nature].”7 This is one of the 
fundamentals of Emersonian Transcendentalism: as an idealism, it establishes the primacy of 
spirit above matter, which achieves its actualization in historical time through man. This is 
                                               
5 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism & Humanism,” trans. Philip Mairet (London: Methuen, 2007), p. 47. 
6 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “History,” in Ralph Waldo Emerson – Nature & Selected Essays, ed. L. Ziff 
(New York: Penguin Classics, 2003), pp. 149-73 (p. 149). 
7 Ibid., “History,” p. 149. 
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pivotal in Emersonianism: the fact that spirit gets actualised in social and historical reality 
through man. 
Thus for Emerson, spirit is encapsulated in nature; and nature itself is envisioned as 
the ‘not-me’: 
 
Philosophically considered, the universe is composed of Nature and the Soul. Strictly 
speaking, therefore, all that is separate from us, all which Philosophy distinguishes as 
the NOT ME, that is, both nature and art, all other men and my own body, must be 
ranked under this name, NATURE.8 
 
Consequently, nature may be conceived as the primordial negation of the transcendental self.  
In fact, we could argue that nature is to Emersonian engagement what nothingness is 
to Sartrean commitment. Nevertheless, the major divergence with Sartrean ontology is that 
for Sartre nothingness is nothing but the product of reflexive consciousness; whereas for 
Emerson, nothingness – which is incarnate in nature – is a collateral effect of the universal 
mind that runs through men. One form of nothingness – that of Sartre – is self-reflective in 
origin; the other – that of Emerson – intuitive: two distinct ontological modalities that will be 
helpful for the rest of the argument. 
 
Meanwhile, both Sartrean Existentialism and Emersonian Transcendentalism typify 
forms of engagement that are, in principle, self-creative. For Sartre, an individual may 
achieve authenticity through a wholesome commitment to his or her concomitant socio-
historical reality; a commitment that allows the individual to define, and perpetually 
regenerate, itself. This imperative for self-realisation, to a large extent, mirrors Emerson’s 
                                               
8 Ibid., ‘Nature’, pp. 35-82 (p. 36). 
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exhortation to fulfill the idea within the self wholly and without constraints, through intuitive 
actions; actions that engender a dynamic interplay between nature and the soul, that is 
between outer and inner nature. 
Such actions exemplify a type of engagement which is predicated by the universal 
mind and which inevitably centers human agency. As Larzer Ziff puts it, “the spirit that is 
present behind nature does not act upon us from without but acts within us.”9 And this effect, 
this “act [of nature] within the self,”10 is referred to as the “intuition” by Emerson; it 
corresponds to ‘the most direct channel between man and the realm of absolute spiritual 
reality’.11 This means, ontologically, that Emersonian forms of engagement do not rely on a 
consciousness of death sensu stricto, as nothingness does in the Sartrean model; rather they 
build on the intuition of the principle of creation within man, which is the insight of the 
universal mind. As the intuition assumes a mutability that is characteristic of the eternal cycle 
of nature, this principle articulates the fluctuations of growth and decay ad infinitum, thereby 
encapsulating endless processes of self-creation and self-destruction all together. 
Thus envisaged as the voice of the divine speaking through man’s soul, the intuition is 
fundamental in Emersonian engagement; it corresponds to a self-creative process which is 
spiritual in essence, and through which the self may acquire the impulse to act and 
concomitantly regenerate itself. 
 
This conception of intuitive performativity is foregrounded in the Emersonian 
principle of immanence; a principle which collapses temporality. By way of immanence, 
man’s time, as an exclusive function of the intuition, equates that of nature; therefore, man’s 
                                               
9 Larzer Ziff, ed., Ralph Waldo Emerson – Nature & Selected Essays (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003), 
p. 17. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Robert Caponigri, “Brownson and Emerson: Nature and History,” ed. by B. M. Barbour, American 
Transcendentalism: An Anthology of Criticism (London: Notre Dame UP, 1973), p. 242. 
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temporal condition becomes aligned with that of the universal principle of creation – the 
godhead – in which time is but an eternal present, with no beginning nor end. 
Not only does this predicament invalidate all conception of divine predestination 
forced upon the self; it also promotes a high level of autonomy, where the individual 
negotiates the demands of his or her own intuitive self in the succession of present moments. 
In this sense, Emersonian immanence anticipates the temporal parameters of Existentialist 
authenticity. 
Nevertheless, one of the main ontological implications of this form of immanence is 
that essence precedes existence, since man is predicated by the creative spirit. Therefore, 
“history, as it turns out, is a sediment, a reminder of the fact that something has taken place 
before”;12 a conception at odds with the Existentialism of Sartre, for whom existence 
precedes essence. Sartre starts strictly from the phenomenological existence of the subject 
who, through an act of consciousness, projects his or her own self outwards in historical 
reality. His atheistic outlook makes man’s consciousness the only repository of authenticity. 
Sartre, however, overlooks the implications of immanence for the self, which entail that the 
divine is not merely an end in itself, but primarily a corollary of man’s self-realisation.  
Therefore, by enacting his or her intuition the individual simultaneously realises his or 
her ownmost and innermost self as well as the divine principle in historical reality. And the 
other way round, intuitive actions may be viewed as participating in the instantaneous 
accomplishment of the universal spirit of creation – the godhead – in the here-and-now. 
 
From this perspective, history is envisioned as a physical space that is a function of 
the universal mind; it is conceived as a mere by-product of the creative spirit ingrained in 
                                               
12 Olaf Hansen, Aesthetic Individualism and Practical Intellect: American Allegory in Emerson, Thoreau, 
Adams, and James (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990), p. 83. 
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man. This is how, for Emerson, history becomes biographical: “We are always coming up 
with the emphatic facts of history in our private experience and verifying them here. All 
history becomes subjective; in other words there is no proper history, only biography.”13 
Here, all historical and material contingencies are discredited – reflecting the idealism of 
Emersonianism; whereas in Sartrean Existentialism, they are acknowledged and fought 
against. According to Caponigri: 
 
The individual is freed from historical dependence and set up on the ultimate plane of 
Being itself. In the ultimate order of Being, his individual life has been orientated 
toward the absolute which he is admonished to recognize as his sole cause.14 
 
As a result, Emersonian forms of engagement extend primarily vertically towards the 
godhead, which is included in the self. The horizontal commitment to historical reality that it 
simultaneously exemplifies is but an after-effect of this vertical engagement, since, for 
Emerson, man’s actions in the world are envisaged as a sequel to the realisation of the 
intuition as we have seen. This direction differs from that exemplified by Sartrean forms of 
engagement: Sartre promotes a commitment that is exclusively directed outwards towards 
historical and social reality, and which is, therefore, strictly horizontal. 
 
In the end, for Emerson as well as for the American Transcendentalist tradition to a 
large extent, the pursuit of existential authenticity stems from a dedication to the 
magnificence of man’s individual existence. As Emerson argues in “Self-reliance”: 
 
                                               
13 Emerson, ‘History’, p. 153. 
14 Caponigri, “Brownson and Emerson,” p. 246. 
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The moment [man] acts from himself, tossing the laws, the books, idolatries and 
customs out of the window, we pity him no more but thank and revere him; – and that 
teacher shall restore the life of man to splendor and make his name dear to all 
history.15 
 
Such an ontological formulation results in an existential authenticity that references a militant 
individualism, embodied in the values of self-reliance and anticonformism championed by 
Emersonian Transcendentalism; an authenticity of a distinctive type which contributes to lay 
the foundations for a variant of Existentialism, typically American and Romantic in 
inspiration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
15 Emerson, “Self-reliance,” p. 195. 
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